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Abstract—We design an optimal contract between a demand
response aggregator (DRA) and power grid customers for
incentive-based demand response. We consider a setting in which
the customers are asked to reduce their electricity consumption
by the DRA and they are compensated for this demand curtail-
ment. However, given that the DRA must supply every customer
with as much power as she desires, a strategic customer can
temporarily increase her base load in order to report a larger
reduction as part of the demand response event. The DRA wishes
to incentivize the customers both to make costly effort to reduce
load and to not falsify the reported load reduction. We model
this problem as a contract design problem and present a solution.
The proposed contract consists of two parts: a part that depends
on (the possibly inflated) load reduction as measured by the DRA
and another that provides a share of the profit that accrues to
the DRA through the demand response event to the customers.
Since this profit accrues due to the total load reduction because
of the actions taken by all the customers, the interaction among
the customers also needs to be carefully included in the contract
design. The contract design and its properties are presented and
illustrated through examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Response (DR), in which a utility company or
an aggregator motivates customers to curtail their power
usage, has now become an acceptable method in situations
where high peaks in demand occur, transmission congestion
increases, or some power plants are not available to generate
enough power [2], [3], [4], [5]. Per the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (FERC), demand response is the change
in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of
electricity or any other incentive [6].
In general, DR programs may be divided into two main
categories: Price Based Programs (PBP) and Incentive Based
Programs (IBP). PBPs refer to schemes in which the electricity
price varies as a function of variables such as the time of usage
or the total demand, with the expectation that the consumers
will adjust their demand in response to such a price profile.
On the other hand, IBPs offer a constant price for power
to every user; however, customers are offered a reward if
they reduce their demand when the utility company desires.
Classically, these incentives were proposed to be constant and
based only on customer participation in the program; however,
market-based incentives that offer a reward that varies with the
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amount of load reduction that a customer achieves have also
been proposed. There exists a rich literature for IBPs (e.g,
see [7], [8], [9], [10] and the references therein) studying
the design of suitable incentives with aims such as social
welfare maximization, minimization of electricity generation
and delivery costs, and reducing renewable energy supply
uncertainty for demand response.
In this paper, we consider an incentive based program for
demand response where the customers are rewarded financially
by a demand response aggregator (which role can also be
filled by a utility company) for their load reduction during
DR events. When called upon to reduce their loads, each
customer puts in some effort to achieve a true value of load
reduction. The effort is costly to the customers since it causes
them discomfort. Further, the amount of effort expended is
private knowledge for each customer. Incentivizing customers
to put in effort in this setting is the problem of moral
hazard [11, Chapter 4]. Following the rich literature back
to Holmstrom [12], as a means to incentivize the customer
to put in ample effort in the presence of moral hazard, the
demand response aggregator (DRA) must pay each customer
proportional to the effort that the customer puts in. However,
by taking advantage of the fact that the DRA must supply
as much power as the customer desires and by anticipating
the demand response call, a strategic customer can artificially
inflate her base load before an expected DR event. In other
words, the true amount of load reduction is also private
knowledge for the customer. By artificially inflating the base
load, for the same nominal load reduction, the customer can
report more measured load reduction and gain more financial
reward from the DRA [13], [14]. This implies that the problem
of adverse selection [11, Chapter 3] is also present.
That such strategic behavior by customers to exploit IBPs is
not idle speculation has been pointed out multiple times [14],
[15]. In 2013, it was revealed that the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission issued large civil penalties to customers for
exactly this sort of strategic behavior [16]. For instance, En-
erwise paid a civil penalty of $780,000 for wrongly claiming
on the behalf of its client, the Maryland Stadium Authority
(MSA), that it reduced the baseline electricity usage in 2009
and 2010 at Camden Yards. It may also be pointed out that the
possibility of behavior in which “phantom DR occurs through
inflated baseline” to obtain “payments for fictitious reductions”
was pointed out in a related but different context by California
ISO in its opinion on FERC order 745 [17]. To avoid this
phantom demand response, a payment structure to incentivize
a rational customer to provide maximal effort and low (or no)
misreporting is needed.
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2While there is much literature that uses competitive game
theory in smart grids particularly for solutions based on
concepts such as pricing (e.g., [18], [19] and the references
therein), much of this literature assumes the users to be
truthful and non-anticipatory. While this is often a good
assumption in cases where users are price taking and either
unable or unwilling to transmit false information, it can lead to
overly optimistic results in the framework discussed above. We
consider anticipatory and strategic customers that maximize
their own profit by predicting the impact of their actions and
possibly falsifying any information they transmit.
Of more interest to our setting is the literature on contract
design for DR with information asymmetry and strategic
behavior. For instance, [13] proposed a DR contract that avoids
inefficiencies in the presence of a strategic sensor; however, the
possibility of baseline inflation was not considered. [20] pro-
posed a DR market to maximize the social welfare; however,
the baseline consumption levels were assumed to be known.
The works closest to ours in this stream are [21] and [22]. [21]
considered a two-stage game for DR. Assuming knowledge
of the utility function of the consumer, the authors proposed
using a linear penalty function for the deviation of the usage
level from the reported baseline to induce users to report their
true baselines, while at the same time adjusting the electricity
price appropriately to realize the desired load reduction. [22]
designed a two-stage mechanism to induce truth telling by
the customer irrespective of the utility function of the DRA.
The proposed mechanism relied on assuming a linear utility
function for the customers, a deterministic baseline and a low
probability of occurrence of the DR event. Unlike these works,
we design a contract which maximizes the utility function
of the DRA (which includes the payment to the customer)
and a more general utility function for the customer that
includes falsification and effort costs, as well as constraints
of individual rationality.
In economics, contract design with either moral hazard or
adverse selection alone has a vast literature (for a summary,
see, e.g., [23, Chapter 14B] and [23, Chapter 14C]). In
the problem we consider, moral hazard followed by adverse
selection arises. This combination is much less discussed in
the literature and is significantly more difficult since incentives
to solve moral hazard (for instance, through payments that are
an increasing function of the reported effort) may, in fact,
exacerbate the problem of adverse selection by incentivizing
larger falsification of the reported effort. A notable exception
is [11, Chapter 7] which considers a specific buyer-seller
framework with two hidden actions and two hidden pieces
of information. In this stream, the closest works to our setup
are [24], [25] who study the problem of incentivizing a single
manager (a single customer in our framework) by the owner of
a firm (the DRA in our framework) and propose a contract by
assuming accurate revelation of the private information of the
manager to the owner in long run. Our formulation includes
the more general case of multiple customers with the DRA
obtaining non-accurate knowledge of the load reduction by
the customers even in the long run.
The chief contribution of this paper is the design of a
contract to maximize the utility function of the DRA while
incentivizing rational customers to expend costly effort to
reduce their load. The contract addresses the issue of moral
hazard followed by adverse selection that is enabled by the
fact that knowledge of the effort put in as well as that of the
true load savings realized are both private to the customers.
The contract that we propose consists of two parts: one
part that pays the customer based on the (possibly falsified)
reported load reduction, and another that provides a share
of the profit that accrues to the DRA through the demand
response event to the customer. One interesting result is that
the optimal contract may lead to both under-reporting and
over-reporting of load reduction by the customer depending
on the true load reduction realized by the customer. In other
words, if a strategic customer wishes to maximize her profit,
she may sometimes decrease her base load before the DR
event to under-report her power reduction as a part of DR
event. We also show that the DRA can realize any arbitrary
demand reduction by contracting with an appropriate number
of customers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the problem statement is presented. In Section III, we
propose a contract structure for the DR problem. Next, in
Section IV, we derive the optimal strategy chosen by DRA
and the customers in response, discuss the interactions among
customers, and study several extensions of the problem. In
Section V, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the
results. Section VI concludes the paper and presents some
avenues for future work.
Notation: fX |A(x|a) (which is often simplified to f (x|a)
when the meaning is clear from the context) denotes the
probability distribution function (pdf) of random variable X
given the event A = a. A Gaussian distribution is denoted
by N (m,σ2) where m is the mean and σ is the standard
deviation. For two functions g and h, g∗h denotes the convo-
lution between g and h. EX [ f ] specifies that the expectation
of function f is taken with respect to the random variable X ;
when X is clear from the context, we abbreviate the notation
to E[ f ]. Given N variables x1, · · · ,xN , the set defining their
collection is denoted by {xi}Ni=1, or sometimes simply by {xi}.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
During a DR event, the DRA calls on the customers to
decrease their power consumption. A contract that pays the
customers merely for the act of reducing the load will not
incentivize the customers to exert the maximal effort for
reducing the load by as much amount as possible. To solve
this problem, the DRA may offer a contract that makes the
payment to the customer proportional to the load reduction.
However, with such a contract, a strategic customer will try
to anticipate the DR event and increase her base load, i.e.,
the load before the demand response event began. This pre-
increase allows the customer to reduce the load during the DR
event by a larger amount than would have been possible in the
absence of such an increase; thus, receiving a larger payment
even though the DRA accrues the benefit of only a smaller true
load reduction. The central problem considered in this paper
is to design a contract that is free from both these problems.
3Figure 1: Timeline of the DR event and the proposed contract.
Remark 1. It is worth pointing out that the falsification of
the load reduction claimed by the customer may happen even
though the load at the customer is being monitored constantly
and accurately. Further, the DRA can not find the ‘true’ base
load by considering the load used by a customer at some
arbitrary time before the DR event. For one, this simply shifts
the problem of customer manipulation of the load to an earlier
time. Second, some of the increase in the base load may be
due to true shifts in customer need due to, e.g., increased
temperature.
A. Timeline
Consider N customers denoted by i = 1, · · · ,N that are
contracted with a DRA. We refer to the timeline shown in
Figure 1 to explain the sequence of events. At time t1, strategic
customers anticipate that a DR event is likely to begin at time
t2. Accordingly, at this time, each customer i calculates the
effort ai she is willing to put in for the load reduction during
the DR event. We assume that this effort costs the customer
h(ai). Further, this effort leads to a reduction in the load by an
amount xi that can depend on local conditions that are private
knowledge for the i-th customer. For instance, a factory might
be able to induce a large load reduction with a small effort
based on its assembly line requirements given the orders it has
to fulfill. The DRA is assumed to know the probability density
function f (xi|ai) according to which xi is realized, while the
customer knows the local conditions and can calculate the
value of xi that will be realized. After this calculation, each
customer i at time t1 may increase (or decrease) the load by
an amount Ii in anticipation of the DR event.
Assumption 1. The random variables describing the load
reductions are conditionally independent given the actions
taken by all the customers, so that
f (x1,x2, · · · ,xN |a1,a2, · · · ,aN)= f (x1|a1) f (x2|a2) · · · f (xN |aN).
Assumption 2. For ease of computation, we assume that xi
is a noisy signal of the action, i.e.,
xi = ai+ ei, (1)
where the random variables {ei} are i.i.d with mean me and
variance σ2. Assumption 1 can thus be stated as
f (e1,e2, · · · ,eN) = f (e1) f (e2) · · · f (eN).
We first consider the case when me = 0 and extend the results
to the case when me 6= 0 in Section IV-D1.
At time t2, the DR event begins and the DRA calls on the
customers to decrease their loads. Each customer i now makes
the predetermined effort ai leading to a reduction of her load
by xi. The DR event ends at t3 with each customer i having
reported that she decreased the load by an amount Ri. Note
that the true reduction in the load for the i-th customer is
xi = Ri− Ii, while the false report1 is Ri.
We also show the times t0 and t4 in the timeline in
Figure 1. At time t0 (much before t1), the contract specifying
the payment structure is signed between the DRA and the
customers. We assume that t0 is sufficiently early, so that at t0,
the customers too do not know the local conditions and must
consider their expected utility according to the probability
density functions f (xi|ai) (or, equivalently, f (ei)). At time t4,
at least a part of the payment Pi as specified by the contract
to the customers is paid by the DRA to incentivize them to
participate in the DR event. The time t4 is sufficiently close
to the DR event, so that the realized value of xi is not known
at time t4 to the DRA. The contract may specify that the rest
of the payment is done at some later time t5, when the DRA
may have more knowledge of the true value of xi.
B. Utility Functions
The effort cost suffered by the i-th customer for an effort ai
is given by a function h(ai) that is known to all the customers
and the DRA. Further, for a true reduction xi, if the customer
manipulates her base load and reports the reduction to be Ri,
she suffers a falsification cost gi(Ri − xi). This can model,
e.g., any extra payment by the customer for boosting her
consumption as she manipulated the load prior to the DR
event. For simplicity, we assume that gi(Ri− xi) = βi (Ri−xi)
2
2 ,∀i, where βi > 0. Thus, with a payment Pi, the utility of the
i-th customer is given by
Vi =−h(ai)−βi (Ri− xi)
2
2
+Pi, i = 1, · · · ,N.
The utility of the DRA is given by its net profit, which is
the difference of the gross profit that occurs due to the load
reduction by the customers and the payments made to the
customers as part of the contract. For simplicity, we assume
that the gross profit made due to reduction of load xi is equal
to xi; more complicated cases can be easily considered. With
a total payment ∑Ni=1 Pi, the utility of the DRA is given by
Π=
N
∑
i=1
(xi−Pi).
C. Problem Formulation
We assume that the customers and the DRA are rational
and risk neutral, so that they seek to maximize the expected
value of their utility functions. The problem we consider in this
paper is for the DRA to design a contract that maximizes its
1We wish to emphasize again that the load at the customer is being
accurately monitored at all times.
4own utility when rational customers choose actions {ai} and
reports {Ri} to optimize their own utility functions. Denote
by X the set of random variables describing the actual load
reductions generated by the customers, i.e, X , {X1, · · · ,XN}
and by E the set {E1, · · · ,EN}. Further, denote by X−i the
set of random variables describing the load reductions of all
customers except i, i.e, X−i ,X \{Xi} and by E−i the set
EE \{Ei}. Thus, the optimization problem P1 to be solved by
DRA is given by
P1:

max
{Pi}
EE [Π]
s.t. {ai,Ri} is chosen to maximize EE [Vi] by each
customer i
individual rationality and incentive
compatibility constraints for all the customers.
As stated in problem P1, we impose two constraints on the
contract.
a) Individual rationality: We assume that the DRA can
not force customers to participate in the load reduction pro-
gram due to political or social reasons. Instead, the contract
should be individually rational so that a rational customer
chooses to participate. We impose this constraint in the form
of ex ante individual rationality. This constraint requires that
no customer chooses to walk away from the contract at time
t0 before she knows either her own load saving or the savings
of the other customers; thus, EE [Vi]≥ 0,∀i.
b) Incentive compatibility: Incentive Compatibility is a
standard constraint imposed in mechanism design which is
used to limit the space of the contracts we need to optimize
over (see, e.g., [26]). Specifically, this constraint implies that
the utility of the consumers does not increase if they calculate
their report Ri based on any arbitrary quantity other than the
true value of their load reduction xi. Further, this constraint
also implies that without loss of generality, a customer with
private information of load reduction xi would always prefer
the payment Pi(xi) over the alternatives Pi(xˆi) for any xˆi 6= xi.
We make the following further assumptions:
Assumption 3. (i) (Deterministic Policies) The customers
choose effort ai according to deterministic policies.
Stochastic policies would imply additional stochasticity
in P1 that we do not consider in this paper.
(ii) (Communication Structure) Individual customers cannot
communicate with each other, so that the load reduction
Ri claimed by the i-th customer as well as the true profit
xi and hidden action ai for this customer are not known
to the other customers. The DRA does not have access
to xi and ai till possibly at a much later time t5 t4.
(iii) (Public Knowledge of Functional Forms) The functional
forms of hi, gi, the probability distribution functions
{ f (ei)}, the weights {βi}, and the contracts offered are
known to all the customers and the DRA.
We now proceed to present our solution to the problem P1.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED CONTRACT
In this section, we present a contract as a solution of the
problem P1. To this end, we begin by discussing why some
intuitive contracts may fail.
A. Some Intuitive Contracts
For simplicity, in this section, we restrict our attention to
the scenario when only one customer is present. For notational
ease, when N = 1, we drop the subscript i referring to the i-th
customer.
Example 1. Consider a contract that provides a constant
payment c to the customer for decreasing her load. Then, the
utility function of the customer is given by:
V = cu(R)−β (R− x)
2
2
−h(a),
where u(.) is the unit step function. In this case, the customer
seeking to maximize her utility, will choose a = 0 (i.e., no
action) but R = 0+ (i.e., minimal load reduction reported
irrespective of true value of x), independently of the value
of c. The utility function of the DRA is given by
Π= x− cu(R).
Thus, if zero action leads to zero true load reduction, the DRA
ends up making a payment in spite of not achieving any load
reduction. Thus, this contract is unsuitable for the DRA.
The contract proposed in Example 1 fails because it does
not account for the fact that the amount of effort is known only
to the customer and not the DRA. Since the effort is costly,
this generates the problem of moral hazard [11, Chapter 4].
To induce a positive load reduction in spite of the presence
of moral hazard, the contract must make at least part of the
payment proportional to the amount of the load reduction.
Otherwise, as discussed above, a rational customer will not
choose any non-zero effort.
Example 2. Consider a contract in which the DRA provides
an incentive cR to the customer in response to the reported
reduction R at time t4. Then, the utility function of the customer
is given by:
V = cR−β (R− x)
2
2
−h(a),
while the utility function of the DRA is given by
Π= x− cR.
Especially if β is small, this contract would result in the
customer choosing a = 0 and misreporting a large R to
maximize E[V ]. Once again, the contract will be unsuitable
for the DRA.
The reason the contract in Example 2 fails is that the DRA
does not have access to the true load reduction x at t4 when it
has to make at least part of the payment. This creates the
problem of adverse selection [11, Chapter 3]. If the DRA
relies on the reported value R for the payment, this creates an
incentive for the customer to misreport R as high as possible
to gain maximal payment (modulo the falsification cost).
Remark 2. If the problem is one that displays only one of
moral hazard or adverse selection, optimal contracts can be
designed using standard methods from the literature. However,
5such contracts are unsuitable for the problem P1 since
we face the problem of moral hazard followed by adverse
selection.
We conclude this discussion with the following result.
Lemma 1. Assume that the DRA has accurate knowledge of
the true load reduction xi at time t4.
• The level of effort ai by the i-th customer which maximizes
the utility of the DRA is given by
a?i = argmaxE[xi−h(ai)].
• The DRA can ensure that the effort a?i is expended by
the each customer i by offering a contract that specifies
payments of the form
Pi = E[xi−a?i +h(a?i )]. (2)
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, we propose a contract structure for the problem P1
using a two-part payment structure.
B. Proposed Contract Structure
The contract that the DRA offers to the customers should at
once incentivize them to put in costly effort and to report the
load reduction truthfully. We propose a contract in which the
payment to the i-th customer is given by a pair of the form
{Bi(Ri),αi}, where
• Bi(Ri) is a bonus which is rewarded to the i-th customer
at t4 after the customer reports load reduction Ri, and
• αi is the share of its own gross profit that the DRA
realizes due to the demand reduction by the customers
and pays back to the i-th customer at a much later time
t5 t4.
Note that the payment of the share supposes that the DRA
knows the profit it obtains as a result of the load reductions
by the customers at time t5. We first consider the case when
this profit is known to the DRA perfectly. We then extend the
results to the case when the gross profit can only be estimated
(possibly with some error) in Section IV-D2.
The proposed contract results in the payment function for
the i-th customer as given by
Pi = αixi+Bi(Ri). (3)
Further, the utility function of the customer can be written as
Vi = αixi+Bi(Ri)−h(ai)−βi (Ri− xi)
2
2
, (4)
while the utility function for the DRA is given by
Π=
N
∑
i=1
(xi−Pi) =
N
∑
i=1
(1−αi)xi−
N
∑
i=1
Bi(Ri). (5)
By invoking the revelation principle [11], without loss of
optimality, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms (where
xˆi = xi) that are incentive compatible. Further, to emphasize
the dependence of the utilities on the bonus function and the
share, we will sometimes write Vi as Vi(Bi(Ri),αi) and Π as
Π({Bi(Ri)},{αi}).
Finally, to ensure that the problem P1 is non-trivial with
this contract, we will impose the following further constraints
on the problem.
Assumption 4. The DRA does not provide all the profit back
to the customers, i.e., ∑Ni=1αi < 1.
Assumption 5. The bonus is always positive, i.e., Bi(Ri)≥ 0.
Bi(Ri) < 0 will imply that the DRA can fine the customers
which we disallow in keeping with the individual rationality
constraints. We will also assume that Bi(Ri) is twice differen-
tiable and concave in Ri and further that Bi(Ri) is designed
such that EE [Vi(B(R∗i ),αi)] is concave in ai, where R∗i is the
optimal report by the i-th customer as a function of her load
reduction.
IV. DESIGN OF THE CONTRACT
In this section, we solve for the optimal contract by solving
the problem P1. We begin by exploring the design space in
terms of identifying the properties that any contract should
satisfy.
A. An Impossibility Result
The first question that arises is if we can design any contract
that incentivize the consumers not to misreport and set Ri = xi
for all i. While naive applications of the revelation principle
may suggest that such contracts are not only possible, but that
limiting our consideration to such contracts is without loss of
generality, this is not the case if the revelation principle is
interpreted properly in our context. Note that the if a contract
that ensures Ri = xi were possible, Lemma 1 states that the
optimal efforts as desired by the DRA are given by {a?i }Ni=1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 4 and 5, there exists no
contract for problem P1 which simultaneously guarantees
elicitation of the truth from the customers (in the sense that
Ri = xi) and the realization of the efforts {a?i }.
Proof. See Appendix.
B. Contract Design
We now design the payment schemes for the contract to
solve problem P1. We solve problem P1 in three steps:
1) First, we characterize what the optimal value of the load
reduction claimed by each customer would be for a given
contract (αi,Bi(Ri)). Thus, we find the optimal value R∗i
of Ri, as the solution of the problem
R∗i = argmax
Ri
EE−i [V (Bi(Ri),αi)]. (6)
2) Then, for this value R∗i , we calculate the optimal effort
a∗i exerted by the customers, i.e., we solve the problem
a∗i = argmax
ai
EE [V (Bi(R∗i ),αi)]. (7)
3) Finally, having characterized the response of the cus-
tomers, we optimize the parameters of the proposed
contract for the DRA. Thus, we solve
{B∗(.),α∗i }= argmax
{Bi(.)},{αi}
EE [Π({Bi(R∗i ),{αi})], (8)
6when the customers exert the efforts {a∗i } and report reduc-
tions {R∗i }. We continue with the following result on the first
step.
Theorem 2. Consider the optimization problem P1. The
optimal choice of the reported load reduction Ri obtained as
a solution to the problem (6) is given by the solution to the
following equation
R∗i − xi =
1
βi
∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
. (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
This result characterizes the optimal reporting by the cus-
tomer. We note the following interesting feature.
Corollary 1. With the payment scheme Pi=αixi +Bi(Ri) in
problemP1, if Bi(Ri) is a decreasing (respectively increasing)
in Ri, then the customer underreports (respectively overre-
ports) her true load reduction.
Proof. The proof follows directly from (9).
Remark 3. Since Bi(Ri) may be a decreasing and an increas-
ing function for different values of Ri, the optimal contract may
induce both under-reporting and over-reporting of the load
reduction by the customer. In other words, for some values of
the true load reduction, it is possible that a strategic customer
may decrease her base load before the DR event and under-
report her power reduction to maximize her profit.
Next, we characterize the optimal effort by solving the
problem (7).
Theorem 3. Consider the optimization problem P1. The
optimal choice of the effort ai is obtained as the solution of
the equation
a∗i = αi+
∂ EE
[
Bi(R∗i )− 12βi
(
∂Bi(Ri)
∂Ri
∣∣
Ri=R∗i
)2]
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
, (10)
where R∗i is as specified in Theorem 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, having characterized the response of the customers,
the third step is to optimize the parameters of the proposed
contract by solving (8).
Theorem 4. Consider the problem formulation in Section II
and the optimization problem P1. The optimal choice of the
share assigned to i-th customer and the optimal bonus function
are defined implicitly through the equations
α∗i = 1−
a∗i +
∂ EE [Bi(Ri)]
∂αi
∣∣∣
αi=α∗i
∂a∗i
∂αi
∣∣∣
αi=α∗i
(11)
B∗(R∗i ) = argmax [(1−α∗i )a∗i −EE [B∗(R∗i )]] , (12)
where a∗i , and R∗i are evaluated using (9) and (10).
Proof. Proof follows directly from (8).
C. Example Contracts
Notice that equations (9)-(12) do not constrain the choices
of the contract terms or the resulting actions of the customers
to be unique. We now make more assumptions on the problem
and provide some example contracts that result. We consider
two scenarios:
• Unspecified load reduction: In the first scenario, we con-
sider the case when the DRA is interested in the overall
load reduction from all the customers to be as large as
possible. In this case, we propose a bonus function of
the form Bi(Ri) = µ(Ri− c) for every customer i with ,
where c≥ 0 is a specified constant.
• Specified load reduction: In the second case, we assume
that the DRA wishes the overall load reduction to be
equal to a given value Γ. In this case, the customers are
in competition with each other for the load reduction they
provide and the consequent payment they obtain. Thus,
we must consider the bonus function to customer i to
be a function of not only her own report Ri, but also
the reports from other customers. Following the classical
Cournot game [27], we propose a bonus function of the
form Bi({Ri}) = Ri(λ −∑Nj=1 R j), where λ is a designer-
specified parameter that depends on Γ.
1) Unspecified load reduction: We begin with the case
when the bonus function is of the form Bi(Ri) = µ(Ri−R0)
for all customers. In this case, there is no competition among
the customers. Our first result says that we can simplify the
incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 1. Consider the problem P1 such that ∀i, the bonus
function does not depend on R j, j 6= i and is further of the
form Bi(Ri) = B(Ri). If the proposed contract structure in (3)
is incentive compatible, then it holds that ∀i,
∂B(Ri)
∂xi
= βi(Ri− xi)∂Ri∂xi and
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
In particular for the contract B(Ri) = µ(Ri−R0), these con-
ditions reduce to
∂Ri
∂xi
(µ−βi(Ri− xi)) = 0 and ∂Ri∂xi ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 4. The result implies that an incentive compatible
contract will associate higher load reduction xi with a higher
report Ri.
With this result, we can restate the problem to be solved by
the DRA as
P2:

max
{µ,{αi}}
EE [Π]
s.t. {ai,Ri} is chosen to maximize EE [Vi] by each
customer i
µ ≥ 0
Individual rationality constraint: E[Vi]≥ 0
Incentive compatibility constraints: µ = βi(Ri− xi)
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
7The following result summarizes the optimal contract and
the resulting actions under it for the problem P2.
Theorem 5. Consider the problem P2 posed above.
• The optimal contract obtained as a solution to the prob-
lem is specified by the relations
µ∗ =
R0βi
2
α∗i = 0.5−µ∗.
• In response to this optimal contract, every customer i
over-reports her true load reduction as R∗i = xi +
µ∗
βi
.
Further, the customer exerts the effort a∗i = µ∗+α∗i .
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 5. Note that the constraint that α∗i ≥ 0 implies the
condition cβi ≤ 1.
2) Specified load reduction: We now consider the case
when Bi(Ri,∑Nj=1 R j) = Ri(λ −∑Nj=1 R j). Once again, we can
simplify the incentive compatibility constraint according to the
following result.
Lemma 2. Consider the problemP1 with a bonus function for
the i-th customer that depends on the report Ri submitted by
the i-th customer and the sum of the reports ∑Nj=1 R j submitted
by all other customers. If the proposed contract is incentive
compatible, then it holds that
∂EE−i
[
B(Ri,∑Nj=1 R j)
]
∂xi
= βi(Ri− xi)∂Ri∂xi
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
In particular for the contract Bi(Ri,∑Nj=1 R j) = Ri(λ −
∑Nj=1 R j), these conditions reduce to
∂Ri
∂xi
λ +βixi− (βi+2)Ri− N∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]
= Ri
∂
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]
∂xi
,
(13)
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now restate the problem P1 to be solved by the
DRA as follows.
P3:

max
{αi}
EE [Π]
s.t. {ai,Ri} is chosen to maximize EE [Vi] by each
customer i
Individual rationality constraint: E[Vi]≥ 0
Incentive compatibility constraints specified by (13)
expected overall load reduction = Γ.
Since the bonus paid to i-th customer is a function not only
of Ri, but also of the reports from the other customers, the
customers compete against each other to gain the maximum
compensation possible. Thus, the optimal strategies of the
players become interdependent. We analyze this interdepen-
dence in the usual Nash Equilibrium sense. For the following
result, we make the simplification that all the parameters αi’s
and βi’s are constants with αi = αN and βi = β , ∀i.
We first present the following initial result.
Theorem 6. Consider the problem P3. Define the variables
A =
β +F
β +1+N
B =
β (β +F)
(β +1)(β +1+N)
C = 1+
2(β +F)2
(β +2)2
− 2(β +F)F
(β +2)
+
β (4−4F +F2)
(β +2)2
D =
( ββ+1+N )
2
C+(N−1)B
E =
N
β +1+N
F =
β (N−1)
(β +1+N)(β +1)
.
There is a unique Nash Equilibrium among the users and the
DRA as given by the following:
(i) The DRA selects the contract as
α∗i =
1−λ [A(1−2ND)+ ββ+1+N (1−2E)]
2(1−ND) (14)
λ ∗ =
(C+(N−1)B)Γ−Nα∗i
AN
. (15)
(ii) The customers exert the optimal effort and report as
a∗i =
αi+Aλ −B
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
a j
C
=
αi+Aλ
C+(N−1)B (16)
R∗i =
λ − (G−Fa∗i )+βxi
β +2
, (17)
where
G =
λ (N−1)
β +1+N
+
β (β +2)
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
a∗j
(β +1)(β +1+N)
.
This equilibrium always exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 6. To obtain the conditions for α∗i ≥ 0, we can
substitute (14) in (15) to obtain
Γ= N
α∗i +A
1−α∗2(1−ND)
A(1−2ND)+ β (1−2E)β+1+N
C+(N−1)B
⇒ α∗i =
A−Γ (C+(N−1)B)[A(1−2ND)+
β (1−2E)
β+1+N ]
N
β (2E−1)
β+1+N +A
.
8Note that the denominator evaluates to
β (2E−1)
β +1+N
+A
=
β
β +1+N
N−β −1
β +N+1
+
β +F
β +1+N
= β
(
2N
(β +N+1)2
+
(N−1)
(β +1+N)2(β +1)
)
≥ 0.
Thus, the condition for α∗i ≥ 0 is refined to the choice of Γ,
N and β which satisfy
Γ≤ NA
(C+(N−1)B)[A(1−2ND)+ β (1−2E)β+1+N ]
.
The condition implies that as the desired load reduction Γ
increases, the number of customers N that the DRA contracts
with must increase as well.
Remark 7. Note that the optimal level of the effort a∗i
expended by the i-th customer is an increasing function of
both the assigned share α and the total amount of desired
load reduction λ , which is intuitively specifying.
D. Extensions
Although the above development was done with some spe-
cific assumptions, the contracts can be generalized to remove
many of these assumptions. We provide some examples below.
For notational ease, we consider the case when N = 1 and
drop the subscript i referring to the i-th customer. Further, we
assume that the parameter β = 1 and the bonus function is
given by B(R) = R(λ −R).
1) Realization error with non-zero mean: The effort a by
the customer is assumed to lead to the realization of load
reduction x. As specified by Assumption 2, in the development
so far, we assumed that the realization error e = x− a is a
random variable with mean zero. If, instead, the error has mean
me, then the following result summarizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 1. Consider the problem P3 for N = β = 1 and
mean me of the realization error.
• The optimal contract is given by
α∗ =
7.5−3λ +4.3me
14
λ ∗ = 5Γ−3(α∗+me) .
• The optimal effort and the report by the customer are
given by
a∗ =
3α+λ −2me
5
R∗ =
λ + x
3
.
Proof. The proof follows in a straight-forward manner along
the lines of that of Theorem 6.
Remark 8. Note that the optimal reporting function R∗ does
not depend on me. Further, as me increases (resp. decreases),
• the expected load saving for the same contract increases
(resp. decreases),
• the optimal effort exerted by customer is lower (resp.
higher),
• the optimal value α∗ of the share provided by DRA to
the customer will increase (resp. decrease).
2) Inexact knowledge of the true load reduction: So far, we
assumed that at t5, the DRA has an accurate knowledge of the
true load reduction x due to the customer. In practice, it may
only be able to estimate this reduction by, e.g., large scale
data analysis on all similar customers on that day or historical
behavioral of the same customer. Let the DRA observe a noisy
estimate y= x+n of the load reduction at t5, where n denotes
the estimation error. We assume that this error in independent
of X and has mean mn. In this case, the share of the profit
assigned to the customer changes to αy. In other words, the
utility functions of the customer and the DRA from (4) and
(5) alter to
V = αy+B(R)−h(a)−β (R− x)
2
2
(18)
Π= (1−α)y−B(R). (19)
We have the following result that can be proved along the lines
of Theorem 6.
Proposition 2. Consider the problem P3 for N = β = 1 and
with n denoting the error in estimating the load reduction x at
t5, so that the utility functions of the customer and the DRA
are given by (18) and (19).
• The optimal contract is given by
α∗ =
7.5−3λ −12.5mn
14
λ ∗ = 5Γ−3α∗.
• The optimal effort and the report by the customer are
given by
a∗ =
3α+λ
5
R∗ =
λ + x
3
.
Remark 9. Note that the optimal reporting function R∗ and
the optimal effort a∗ do not depend on mn. Further, as mn
increases (resp. decreases), the optimal value α∗ of the share
provided by DRA to the customer decreases (resp. increases).
V. ILLUSTRATION AND DISCUSSION
We now present some illustrative numerical examples. We
first consider the unspecified load reduction scenario. We set
R0 = 1 and assume that βi = β , ∀i. Figure 2 presents the
expected utility of the DRA with the optimal contract as
presented in Theorem 5 for various values of β as we vary
the number of the customers N that the DRA contracts with.
As shown in this figure, for a fixed value of β , the expected
utility of the DRA increases linearly with the number of
customers. This is intuitively specifying since as specified by
Theorem 5, for a fixed β , the effort invested by each customer
9Figure 2: Expected utility of the DRA for various values of β
as a function of number of the customers N for the specified
load reduction scenario.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3: Expected utility of the DRA (a), optimal value of
the share to the customers (b), and expected value of the
falsification by the customer as a function of N for various Γ,
under the bonus function Bi = Ri(λ −∑Nj=1 R j), given β = 1.
for the optimal contract is a constant independent of N or µ .
Further, we observe that for a fixed N, as β increases, the
expected utility of the DRA increases. In other words, for the
same expected load reduction, the DRA needs to pay less to
the customers. Note that satisfying the condition for α∗ ≥ 0
precludes the choice of an arbitrarily large β by the DRA.
Next, we consider the specified load reduction scenario.
We set β = 1. Figure 3a shows how the expected utility of
the DRA varies as a function of the number of customers
contracted by the DRA for various value of the total expected
load reduction Γ that the DRA desires. We can observe that
for a small number of customers, the expected utility of the
DRA is a decreasing function of Γ while for large enough N,
it is an increasing function of Γ. Intuitively, if the number of
customers that the DRA has contracted with is too small, it
must pay too high a compensation for realizing the desired
load reduction. In fact, as the expected load reduction that it
wishes increases, the expected utility of the DRA may become
negative unless the number of customers is also increased.
Once a sufficient number of customers have been contracted
with, the total payment once again decreases with the number
of customers. Once again, this does not imply that the number
of customers can be increased arbitrarily given the constraints
of α∗ ≥ 0 and individual rationality for the customers. Viewed
alternatively, for the same number of customers, the total
expected load reduction Γ is bounded by these constraints.
For the same setting, the optimal value of the share α∗
assigned to the customer as a function of the number of
customers for various value of Γ is illustrated in Figure 3b. The
plot indicates that the optimal value of the share assigned to the
customer by the DRA is always positive as desired. Further,
it is a decreasing function of the expected load reduction Γ
desired by the DRA. This plot illustrates that the constraint
α∗ > 0 imposes an upper bound on the accepted value of Γ.
For a given value of Γ, the variation of the optimal share
is non-intuitive, although it should be noted that for a large
enough number of customers, the share converges to the same
value.
Figure 3c displays the expected value of the falsification
by each customer as a function of the number of customers
for various value of Γ. Figure 3c implies that the expected
value of the falsification decreases when the DRA chooses
a larger Γ; in fact, it becomes negative for a high enough Γ.
The negative falsification is interesting since it implies that the
customer under-reports her load reduction. Note that a larger
value of Γ can be interpreted as a higher expected utility of
the DRA. Thus, as the expected utility of the DRA increases,
the customers under-report their true load reduction since they
can gain more compensation through their shares.
Finally, we illustrate the impact of the realization error me
and the estimation error mn. We consider a single customer
and set β = 1. Figure 4a plots the expected payment by the
DRA as a function of me. As can be seen, the pattern of
variation is quite complex. For a large enough me, the expected
load reduction by the customer is large. Thus, the payment
through the shares dominates and the expected payment also
increases. Figure 4b plots the expected payment by the DRA
as a function of mn. The figure illustrates that as the mean
of the error with which the DRA estimates the true load
reduction increases, it increases the compensation it provides
to the customer. In addition, as the DRA wishes to realize
a larger value of Γ, the expected value of the compensation
also becomes larger. This is expected since a higher value of
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mn implies that the DRA observes a higher load reduction
compared to the one realized in practice; consequently, it
rewards the customer more based on its own observation.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: The expected payment to the customer (a) as a
function of me and (b) as a function of mn, for different values
of Γ, given N = 1.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we designed an optimal contract between a
demand response aggregator (DRA) and power grid customers
for incentive-based demand response. We considered a setting
in which the DRA asks the customers to reduce their elec-
tricity consumption and compensates them for this demand
curtailment. However, given that the DRA must supply every
customer with as much power as she desires, a strategic
customer can temporarily increase her base load to report a
larger reduction as part of the demand response event. The
DRA wishes to incentivize the customers both to make costly
effort to reduce load and to not falsify the reported load
reduction. We modeled this problem as a contract design
problem and presented a solution. The proposed contract
consists of a part that depends on (the possibly inflated) load
reduction as measured by the DRA and another that provides
a share of the profit that accrues to the DRA through the
demand response event to the customers. The contract design,
its properties, and the interactions of the customers under the
contract were discussed and illustrated.
The paper opens many directions for future work. We can
consider the dynamic case when the customers need to be
incentivized to participate in demand response repeatedly.
Particularly interesting is the case when the customers also
gain a signal about the total load reductions on a particular day
and can alter their strategies accordingly. Another problem that
should be considered is when the DRA is able to observe only
the sum of the profit due to the effort by multiple customers
and thus the payment cannot be based on individual efforts of
each customer. This may lead to the problem of ‘free-riding’
in which some customers seek payment in spite of not putting
in any effort, by relying on the efforts of other customers.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. If the DRA has accurate knowledge of the true load
reduction xi at time t4, the utility of the DRA is given by
Π = ∑Ni=1(xi−Pi) and that of the i-th customer is given by
Vi = Pi−h(ai). Thus, for any effort ai exerted by the customer,
the payment Pi = h(ai) would solve the problem P1 (notice,
in particular, that the individual rationality constraints will be
satisfied with this payment). Substituting this payment in the
utility of the DRA, we see that the level of effort ai by the i-th
customer which maximizes the expected utility of the DRA is
given by
a?i = argmaxE[xi−h(ai)].
Further, with this effort, the expected utility of the DRA is
given by
E[Π?] =
N
∑
i=1
(a?i −h(a?i )) ,
where we have used Assumption 2. However, this payment
can be implemented only if the DRA could observe ai. We
show that even if ai is unobservable for the DRA, and it can
only observe xi at time t4, it can incentivize the customer to
exert the same effort and realize the maximal utility E[Π?] for
itself. To this end, consider the payment specified by
Pi = xi−a?i +h(a?i ).
With this payment, the expected utility of the i-th customer
can be written as
E[Vi] =E[xi−a?i +h(a?i )]−h(ai)=E[xi−h(ai)]−(a?i −h(a?i )) .
Given the definition of a?i , it is easy to see that the customer i
chooses ai = a?i to maximize her expected utility. Further, the
expected utility of the DRA is given by
Π=
N
∑
i=1
E[xi−Pi] =
N
∑
i=1
E[a?i −h(a?i )] = E[Π?]
Thus, the expected utility of the DRA is maximized with this
choice of the payment.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a
bonus function Bi(Ri) and an allocation {αi} which simulta-
neously satisfies two conditions: (i) C1 : it incentivizes each
customer i to choose the strategy R(xi) = xi, and (ii) C2 : it
incentivizes each customer to choose ai = a?i .
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By C1, the utility of the i-th customer is maximized if she
reports Ri = xi. Since the portion αixi of payment does not
depend on Ri, we can write
∂EE−i [Vi]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣Ri=xi = ∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]∂Ri −βi(Ri− xi)
∣∣∣∣Ri=xi = 0,
⇒ ∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
= 0 (20)
∂ 2EE−i [Vi]
∂Ri2
∣∣∣∣Ri=xi = ∂
2EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂R2i
−βi
∣∣∣∣Ri=xi ≤ 0
⇒ ∂
2EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂R2i
≤ βi. (21)
(20) implies that
EE−i
[
∂Bi(Ri)
∂Ri
]
= 0,
or, in turn, that ∫
E−i
∂Bi(Ri)
∂Ri
fX−idX−i = 0.
Since this equation should hold for all Ri, we must have
Bi(Ri) = c for some constant c. In other words, the DRA
provides a fixed compensation to the customer irrespective of
what she reports. Further, with truthful reporting, Lemma 1
implies that the payment
P =
N
∑
i=1
Pi =
N
∑
i=1
(xi−a?i +h(a?i )) (22)
maximizes the utility of the DRA while ensuring choice of the
desired action a?i by the customers. The fact that Bi(Ri)= c and
that the payment is given by (22) implies that the following
conditions must be met
Bi(Ri) =−
N
∑
i=1
a?i and
N
∑
i=1
αi = 1.
However, this allocation violates Assumptions 4 and 5. Thus,
our supposition is wrong and there does not exist a payment
function that simultaneously guarantees C1 and C2.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We can write (6) as
R∗i = argmax
Ri
EE−i [Vi(Bi(Ri),αi)]
= argmax
Ri
[αixi+EE−i [Bi(Ri)]−βi
(Ri− xi)2
2
−h(ai)].
For optimality, we set
∂ EE−i [Vi(Bi(Ri),αi)]
∂Ri
= 0
⇒∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
− βi
2
∂ (Ri− xi)2
∂Ri
= 0
⇒R∗i − xi =
1
βi
∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
.
Note that the second derivative
∂ 2EE−i [Vi]
∂R2i
=
∂ 2EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂R2i
−βi < 0,
given the concavity of Bi(Ri). Thus, R∗i that satisfies (9) is
indeed a maximizer.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The effort ai is chosen to maximize the utility of the
customer given that the optimal report is calculated as given
in the equation (9). Thus,
a∗i = argmax
ai
EE [Vi(Bi(R∗i ),αi)]
= argmax
ai
EE
[
αixi+Bi(R∗i )−βi
(R∗i − xi)2
2
− a
2
i
2
]
= argmax
ai
[
αiai+EE
[
Bi(R∗i )−
βi
2
(R∗i − xi)2
]
− a
2
i
2
]
,
where we have used Assumption 2. For optimality, we set
∂ EE [Vi(Bi(R∗i ),αi)]
∂ai
= 0.
This condition yields
αi+
∂ EE
[
Bi(R∗i )− βi2 (R∗i − xi)2
]
∂ai
−ai = 0. (23)
Using Theorem 2, we can write this condition as
a∗i = αi+
∂ EE
[
Bi(R∗i )− 12βi
∂Bi(Ri)
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
]
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
.
Finally, given the concavity of EE [Vi(Bi(R∗i ),αi)] in ai, we
note that a∗i is a maximizer.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (4) implies that the utility of the i-th customer,
V (B(Ri),αi), depends on the parameter xi through the report
Ri and the bonus B(Ri). For an incentive compatible contract,
the utility of the i-th customer is maximized when she chooses
to calculate her report (and consequently receive the bonus)
based on xˆi = xi. Envelop theorem thus implies that the optimal
choice of the parameter should satisfy
dV (B(Ri),αi)
dxi
=
∂V (B(Ri),αi)
∂xi
. (24)
We note that
dV (B(Ri),αi)
dxi
=
∂V (B(Ri),αi)
∂B
∂B(R(xi))
∂xi
+
∂V (B(Ri),αi)
∂Ri
∂R(xi)
∂xi
+
∂V (B(Ri),αi)
∂xi
∂xi
∂xi
=
∂B(Ri)
∂xi
−βi(Ri− xi)∂Ri∂xi +
∂V (B(Ri),αi)
∂xi
.
Thus, (24) yields
∂B(Ri)
∂xi
= βi(Ri− xi)∂Ri∂xi .
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To evaluate the second order condition, we start with the
first order incentive compatibility condition as
dV (B(Ri),αi)
dxˆi
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
= 0,
and differentiate both sides with respect to xi to obtain
∂ 2V (B(Ri),αi)
∂ xˆ2i
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
∂ xˆi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
+
∂ 2V (B(Ri),αi)
∂xi∂ xˆi
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
= 0.
The second-order condition for the optimal choice of xˆi implies
that
∂ 2V (B(Ri),αi)
∂ xˆ2i
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
≤ 0.
Thus, we can write
∂ 2V (B(Ri),αi)
∂xi∂ xˆi
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆi=xi
≥ 0
⇒βi
2
∂ 2(Ri− xi)2
∂x2i
∂R(xi)
∂xi
≥ 0
⇒∂R(xi)
∂xi
≥ 0.
In particular, for the contract B(Ri)= µ (Ri−R0), it is straight-
forward to see that these conditions reduce to
∂Ri
∂xi
(µ−βi(Ri− xi)) = 0, ∂Ri∂xi ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. First, the optimal load reduction is specified by Theo-
rem 2. Thus, according to (9), the optimal report is specified
as
R∗i = xi+
1
βi
∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
= xi+
µ
βi
.
Using this report, we can calculate the optimal effort exerted
by the customer using Theorem 3. Thus, from (10), we have
a∗i =αi+
∂ EE
[
Bi(R∗i )− 12βi
(
∂Bi(Ri)
∂Ri
∣∣
Ri=R∗i
)2]
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
=αi+
∂ E[µ(R∗i −R0)− µ
2
2βi
]
∂ai
=αi+
∂ E[µ(xi+ µβi −R0)−
µ2
2βi
]
∂ai
=µ+αi.
The optimal contract can now be specified using Theorem 4.
First, (11) implies the relation
α∗i = 1−
a∗i +
∂ EE [Bi(Ri)]
∂αi
∣∣∣
αi=α∗i
∂a∗i
∂αi
∣∣∣
αi=α∗i
= 1− (µ∗+α∗i )−
∂ EE [µ∗(xi+ µ
∗
βi
−R0)]
∂αi
= 0.5−µ∗. (25)
On the other hand, (12) implies the relation
µ∗ = argmax [(1−α∗i )a∗i −EE [B∗(R∗i )]]
= argmax
[
(1−αi)(µ+αi)−E[µ(xi+ µβi −R0)]
]
= argmax
[
(1−αi)(µ+αi)−µ(µ+αi+ µβi −R0)
]
=
0.5−α∗+ R02
1+ 1β
. (26)
From (25) and (26), we solve µ∗ = cβi2 . Finally, it is straight-
forward to check that the optimal contract satisfies all the
constraints in the problem.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. With the proposed bonus function, the utility of cus-
tomer i depends on the true load reduction by the other
customers since Vi is a function of x j, where j = 1, · · · ,N,
j 6= i. Since Assumption 3 states that customer i does not have
access to the load savings E−i by other customers at the time
of generating the report and obtaining the consequent bonus,
the contract is incentive compatible if the expected utility of
customer i (with expectation taken with respect to E−i) is
maximized if the customer i calculates the report based on her
true load saving xi. Now, following the proof of Lemma 1,
we can obtain that necessary and sufficient conditions for
incentive compatibility as
∂EE−i
[
B(Ri,∑Nj=1 R j)
]
∂xi
= βi(Ri− xi)∂Ri∂xi (27)
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
In particular, for the contract Bi(·) = Ri(λ −∑Nj=1 R j), it is
straightforward to see that these conditions reduce to
∂Ri
∂xi
λ +βixi− (βi+2)Ri− N∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]
= Ri
∂
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]
∂xi
,
∂Ri
∂xi
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We first prove that the contract structure and the effort
and the report specified in the theorem statement specifies a
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Nash equilibrium and then show that the equilibrium is unique
and it always exists. To this end, we start by identifying the
optimal report as specified by Theorem 2 with the specified
bonus function and the assumption βi = β .
Proof of (17): We have
R∗i = xi+
1
β
∂ EE−i [Bi(Ri)]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
= xi+
1
β
∂ EE−i [Ri(λ −Ri−
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
R j)]
∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
= xi+
1
β
∂
Ri(λ −Ri−EE−i [ N∑
j=1
j 6=i
R j])

∂Ri
∣∣∣∣
Ri=R∗i
= xi+
1
β
λ −R∗i − N∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]−R∗i

⇒ R∗i =
λ −
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j]+βxi
β +2
, (28)
where we have used the fact that according to Assumption 3,
R j is a function of x j only and
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE−i [R j] is not a function of
Ri. We take the expectation of both sides of (28) with respect
to E to obtain
EE (R∗i ) =
λ −
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE (R∗j)+βai
β +2
=
λ −
N
∑
j=1
EE (R∗j)+βai
β +1
(29)
⇒
N
∑
j=1
EE (R∗j) =
Nλ +β
N
∑
j=1
a j
β +1+N
. (30)
Subtracting (29) from (30) thus yields
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
EE (R∗j)
=
λ (N−1)
β +1+N
+
β
(β +1)

(β +2)
N
∑
j=1
a j−ai(β +1+N)
(β +1+N)

=
λ (N−1)
β +1+N
+
β
(β +1)

(β +2)
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
a j− (N−1)ai
(β +1+N)

= G−Fai. (31)
Substituting this value in (28), we obtain (17).
Proof of (16): The optimal choice of effort a∗i is specified by
Theorem 3. With the given bonus function and the assumptions
βi = β and αi = α/N, we obtain
a∗i = argmax
ai
EE
[
α
N
xi+R∗i (λ −
N
∑
j=1
R∗j)−
β
2
(R∗i − xi)2−
a2i
2
]
= argmax
ai
(
α
N
ai+EE
[
R∗i (λ −
N
∑
j=1
R∗j)−
β
2
(R∗i − xi)2
]
− a
2
i
2
)
.
Using the first derivative condition to evaluate the optimal
choice of ai, we set
a∗i −
α
N
=
∂EE
[
R∗i (λ −
N
∑
j=1
R∗j)
]
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
− β
2
∂EE
[
(R∗i − xi)2
]
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
. (32)
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We evaluate the terms on the left hand side as follows.
∂EE
[
R∗i (λ −
N
∑
j=1
R∗j)
]
∂ai
= λ
∂EE [R∗i ]
∂ai
−
∂EE
[
(R∗i )
2
]
∂ai
−
∂EE
R∗i N∑
j=1
j 6=i
R∗j

∂ai
= λ
∂EE [R∗i ]
∂ai
−
∂EE
[
(R∗i )
2
]
∂ai
−
∂EE [R∗i ]EE
 N∑
j=1
j 6=i
R∗j

∂ai
(33)
= λ
∂EE
[
λ−(G−Fai)+βxi
β+2
]
∂ai
−
∂EE
[(
λ−(G−Fai)+βxi
β+2
)2]
∂ai
−
∂EE
[
λ−(G−Fai)+βxi
β+2
]
(G−Fai)
∂ai
(34)
= λ
F +β
β +2
− 2
(
(F +β )(λ −G)+(F +β )2ai
)
(β +2)2
+
(λ −G+(F +β )ai)F +(G−Fai)(F +β )
β +2
(35)
where (33) follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that the
report Ri is not dependent on x j for all j 6= i, (34) follows
from (17) and (31), (35) follows from Assumption 2 and
straight-forward algebraic manipulation. Similar manipulation
yields
∂EE
[
(R∗i − xi)2
]
∂ai
=
(2(F−2)(λ −G)−8Fai+8ai+2F2ai)
(β +2)2
.
(36)
Substituting (35) and (36) in (32) and solving for a∗i yields
a∗i =
α
N +
β+F
β+2 (λ −G)
1+ 2(β+F)
2
(β+2)2 −
2(β+F)F
(βi+2)
+ β (4−4F+F
2)
(β+2)2
(37)
=
α
N +Aλ −B
N
∑
j=1
j 6=i
a∗j
C
. (38)
Summing (38) N times for i = 1, · · · ,N, we obtain
(C+(N−1)B)
N
∑
j=1
a∗j = N(
α
N
+Aλ )
⇒
N
∑
j=1
a∗j =
N(αN +Aλ )
C+(N−1)B =
α+NAλ
C+(N−1)B .
Substituting in (38) finally yields (16). The second derivative
condition implies that a∗i is indeed a maximizer.
Proof of (15): Given (16) and Assumption 2, we have that
the overall load reduction
Γ=
N
∑
i=1
EE [xi]
= Na∗i
= N
α∗i +Aλ ∗
C+(N−1)B .
A simple realignment yields (15).
Proof of (14): Given (15), the optimal share is specified
by (8). With the specified bonus function, we have
α∗i = argmax
αi
EE [Π({Bi(R∗i )},{α∗i })]
=
1
N
argmax
α
EE
[
(1− α
N
)
N
∑
i=1
x∗i −
N
∑
i=1
R∗i (λ
∗−
N
∑
j=1
R∗j)
]
.
(39)
From (28) and (30), we can write
N
∑
i=1
R∗i =
Nλ ∗− (N−1)
N
∑
j=1
E
[
R∗j
]
+
N
∑
j=1
βxi
β +2
=Eλ ∗+B1
N
∑
j=1
a∗j +C1
N
∑
j=1
x j, (40)
where E = Nβ+1+N , C1 =
β
β+2 , and B1 = − (N−1)β(β+2)(β+1+N) .
Substituting (40) in (39), we obtain
α∗i =
1
N
argmax
α
(
(1− α
N
)
N
∑
j=1
a∗j
−EE
[(
Eλ ∗+B1
N
∑
j=1
a∗j +C1
N
∑
j=1
x j
)
(
(1−E)λ ∗−B1
N
∑
j=1
a∗j −C1
N
∑
j=1
x j
)])
. (41)
The first order derivative condition implies that α∗ is given by
the equation
− ∑
N
j=1 a
∗
j
N
+
1
C+(N−1)B
[
(1− α
∗
N
)
+(B1+C1)
(
−λ ∗+2(Eλ ∗(B1+C1)
N
∑
j=1
a∗j)
)]
= 0,
which yields
α∗i =
1−λ ∗[A(1−2ND)+(B1+C1)(1−2E)]
2(1−ND)
=
1−λ ∗[A(1−2ND)+ β (1−2E)β+1+N ]
2(1−ND) .
Proof of optimality of the contract: α∗i and λ ∗i have been
chosen to satisfy (8) and the constraint on the total load
reduction. It is easy to verify that the individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints are met. Thus, the contract
is optimal in the sense of solving Problem P3. That the Nash
equilibrium always exists and is unique is clear from the above
derivation of the contract and the optimal actions and reports.
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